

Who Benefits from Universal Child Care? Estimating Marginal Returns to Early Child Care Attendance

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We examine heterogeneous treatment effects of a universal child care program in Germany by exploiting variation in attendance caused by a reform that led to a large expansion staggered across municipalities. Drawing on novel administrative data from the full population of compulsory school entry examinations, we find that children with lower (observed and unobserved) gains are more likely to select into child care than children with higher gains. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds are less likely to attend child care than children from advantaged backgrounds but have larger treatment effects because of their worse outcome when not enrolled in child care.

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I. Introduction

Preschool and early childhood programs are generally considered effective means of influencing child development (see, e.g., Currie and Almond 2011; Ruhm and Waldfogel 2012) both because many skills are best learned when young (e.g., Shonkoff and Phillips 2000) and because the longer payoff period makes such learning more productive (Becker 1964). There may also be important “dynamic complementarities” of early learning with acquisition of human capital at later stages (Cunha and Heckman 2007; Heckman 2007; Aizer and Cunha 2012). In recognition of these benefits, most European countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and all Nordic nations, offer publicly provided universal child care (or preschool) programs aimed at promoting children’s social and cognitive development. In the United States, which offers no nationwide universal preschool program, an important goal of the previous Obama administration’s Zero to Five Plan is to create similar initiatives.¹

Yet despite enormous policy interest, evidence of the effectiveness of child care (or preschool) programs is scarce and far from unified. For example, proponents of child care programs often cite targeted programs such as Head Start or the Perry Preschool Project, which have generated large long-term gains for participants.² Evidence on the effectiveness of universal child care programs targeted at all children, on the other hand, is mixed, with effects ranging from negative to positive.³ One important reason why targeted child care programs yield larger returns than large-scale universal programs may be treatment effect het-

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¹ State-level programs (often referred to as prekindergarten) are currently in place in Georgia, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma and have been enacted or expanded in recent years in Alabama, Michigan, Minnesota, and Montana. A subsidized universal child care program also exists in the Province of Quebec, Canada.

² See, e.g., the papers by Currie and Thomas (1995), Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002), Heckman et al. (2010a, 2010b), Carneiro and Ginja (2014), and the synthesis in Elango et al. (2016).

³ For example, whereas Berlinski, Galiani, and Manacorda (2008), Berlinski, Galiani, and Gertler (2009), Havnes and Mogstad (2011), and Felfe, Nollenberger, and Rodriguez-Planas (2015) find positive mean effects of an expansion in pre-elementary education in Argentina, Uruguay, Norway, and Spain, respectively; Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008, 2018) report negative mean impacts of highly subsidized universal child care in Quebec on behavioral and health outcomes in the short and longer run. Datta Gupta and Simonsen (2010) also find no evidence that enrollment in center-based care at age 3 in Denmark improves child outcomes, and Magnuson, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2007) find mixed effects of pre-K attendance in the United States, including positive short-lived effects on academic skills and negative and more persistent effects on behavioral outcomes. Baker (2011) and Elango et al. (2016) provide extensive reviews of this literature.

erogeneity; that is, the former target children from disadvantaged backgrounds who may benefit more from attending child care programs than the average child, for instance, because they experience lower-quality care in the untreated state (i.e., a worse home environment) but a similar environment in the treated state (because child care programs are of similar quality).⁴

In this paper, we assess treatment effect heterogeneity in a universal preschool or child care program aimed at 3–6-year-olds in Germany. Our goal is to better understand which children benefit most from the program and whether treatment effect heterogeneity can help reconcile the divergent evidence on targeted and universal child care programs. Specifically, we apply the marginal treatment effects (MTE) framework introduced by Björklund and Moffitt (1987) and generalized by Heckman and Vytlačil (1999, 2005, 2007), which relates the heterogeneity in the treatment effect to observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity for child care enrollment. Such a framework produces a more complete picture of effect heterogeneity than the conventional instrumental variable (IV) analysis typically adopted in the literature.

The study context offers two key advantages: First, it allows us to exploit a reform during the 1990s that entitled every child in Germany to a heavily subsidized half-day child care placement from the third birthday to school entry. While the reform somewhat increased attendance rates of 4-year-olds who attend child care for 2 years, it mainly affected the share of children who start child care at age 3 and attend child care for 3 years (an increase from 41 percent to 67 percent, on average, over the program rollout period). We therefore define our baseline treatment as attending child care for (at least) 3 years (which we refer to as “early attendance”) but also show results that explicitly take into account the multivalued nature of our treatment and distinguish between attending child care for 1, 2, or 3 years. The expansion in publicly provided child care was staggered across municipalities, creating variation in the availability of child care slots (our instrument) not only across space but also across cohorts. It thus permits a tighter design for handling nonrandom selection into child care than is typical in the related literature that estimates marginal treatment effects. Second, it offers the unique feature that prior to school entry at age 6, all children must undergo compulsory school entry exams administered by pediatricians. We have obtained rare administrative data

⁴ In line with this argument, a recent excellent synthesis of the literature on early childhood education by Elango et al. (2016) concludes that high-quality programs targeted to children from disadvantaged backgrounds (including Head Start) have positive effects when the effect is measured against the counterfactual of home care but that the effects of universal programs are more ambiguous and crucially depend on the alternative setting that they are substituting for.

from these school entry examinations for the entire population of children in one large region, providing us with a measure of overall school readiness (which determines whether the child is held back from school entry for another year), as well as measures of motor skills and health, including information on overweight. These indicators are important predictors of academic success and health later in life (e.g., Grissmer et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2011).

Unlike many previous studies that use administrative data on child outcomes, we also observe individual child care attendance, which is crucial to our implementation of the MTE framework.⁵ We match the examination data with survey data on the local child care supply in each municipality and base our instrument on changes in the local availability of child care, capturing only arguably exogenous changes in supply (conditional on municipality and cohort effects).

We find substantial heterogeneity in returns to early child care attendance with respect to both observed and unobserved characteristics. Children of immigrant ancestry (hereafter referred to as “minority children”) are less likely to attend child care early but experience higher returns in terms of overall school readiness than native children, which points to a reverse selection on gains based on observed characteristics. The selection on unobserved characteristics reinforces this finding: for our primary outcome of overall school readiness, children with unobserved characteristics that predispose them to early child care entry (“low-resistance children”) benefit the least from early child care attendance, whereas those least likely to enter (“high-resistance children”) benefit the most. As a consequence, the effect of treatment on the untreated (TUT) exceeds the average treatment effect (ATE), which in turn exceeds the effect of treatment on the treated (TT), with TUT being strongly positive and statistically significant and TT being negative. We confirm a pattern of reverse selection on gains when modeling treatment as an ordered choice of attending child care for either 1, 2, or 3 years rather than as a binary decision of attending child care for 3 years or less. Because conventional IV methods typically estimate one overall effect, they do not detect such important treatment effect heterogeneity.

By digging deeper into the reasons for these findings, we show that the higher returns to treatment for high- versus low-resistance children are

⁵ Most papers exploiting child care reforms focus on intention-to-treat effects, partly because information on individual child care attendance is unavailable (see, e.g., Baker et al. 2008; Havnes and Mogstad 2011, 2015; Felfe et al. 2015). Without information on individual treatment status, however, it is impossible to determine whether heterogeneity in intention-to-treat effects is caused by the differential take-up of children or by heterogeneous responses to child care attendance. For example, larger intention-to-treat effects at the bottom or middle part of the outcome distribution found by Havnes and Mogstad (2015) may be driven either by differences in child care take-up or by differences in the impacts of uptake.

driven by worse outcomes in the untreated state—which in the German context is almost exclusively family care by either parents or grandparents—whereas outcomes in the treated state are more homogeneous, in line with the relatively small quality differences between child care programs in our context. Thus, formal child care acts as an equalizer. Our results also suggest that high-resistance children are more likely to come from more disadvantaged backgrounds.

What, then, explains the pattern of reverse selection on gains revealed in this paper? One important reason could be that parental decisions about child care arrangements are based not only on the child's welfare but also on the parents' own objectives. For instance, although well-educated parents could provide their children with a high-quality home environment, they may opt for child care because of their own career concerns and labor market involvement. On the other hand, mothers from disadvantaged or minority backgrounds not only face higher relative child care costs but may also have lower incentives to participate in the labor market. They may also have a more critical attitude toward publicly provided child care or underestimate the returns to investment in their children (see Cunha, Elo, and Culhane 2013). At the same time, the home environment may deprive the children of exposure to peers and the learning activities provided in child care, thereby delaying development.⁶ Moreover, throughout the expansion period, child care decisions were made not only by parents but in case of excess demand also by child care centers. The allocation mechanism adopted by centers, which in addition to the child's age as the primary admission criterion was based on mothers' employment status and time on the waiting list, may have favored majority and advantaged children, since majority and high-skilled mothers are more likely to participate in the labor market and also likely to be better informed about the specific admission process than minority and low-skilled mothers.

In addition to highlighting the importance of heterogeneity both in the "resistance" to child care enrollment and in children's responses to child care attendance, our findings also reconcile the seemingly contradictory results of positive effects for programs targeted at disadvantaged children but mixed effects for universal programs. In terms of relevant policy implications, they suggest that parental choices may differ from

⁶ The positive correlation between parental inputs and parental socioeconomic background is well documented. For example, Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008) provide evidence for a positive relation between maternal education and time spent with children for both nonworking and working mothers. Hart and Risley (1995) and Rowe (2008) also report that low-socioeconomic-status (SES) mothers talk less and use less varied vocabulary during interaction with their children than high-SES mothers, with the latter hearing approximately 11,000 utterances a day compared to 700 utterances for the children of low-SES mothers (Hart and Risley; cited in Rowe [2008]).

those that the children themselves would make, potentially supporting the claim that state involvement in the early child care market may “mimic the agreements that would occur if children were capable of arranging for their [own] care” (Becker and Murphy 1988, 1). Our results also imply that policies that successfully attract high-resistance children not currently enrolled in early child care may yield large returns. Further, programs targeted at minority and disadvantaged children are likely to be more cost-effective and beneficial than universal child care programs.

Our paper makes several important contributions. The sparse research on heterogeneity in returns to child care typically focuses on treatment heterogeneity in observed characteristics or estimates quantile treatment effects (QTE) rather than marginal treatment effects, as we do. For example, consistent with our findings, Cascio and Schanzenbach (2013) show that the universal preschool programs in Georgia and Oklahoma improved test score outcomes of children from low-income families as late as eighth grade but had little impact on children from high-income families. In a similar vein, Havnes and Mogstad (2015), by estimating QTE and local linear regressions by family income, show that children of low-income parents benefit substantially from the child care expansion studied, whereas earnings of upper-class children may have suffered.⁷ Bitler, Hoynes, and Domina (2016) identify the strongest distributional effects for the Head Start program among children in the lower part of the outcome distribution. The MTE approach adopted in our study allows us to uncover treatment heterogeneity not only in observed characteristics (as in Cascio and Schanzenbach [2013]) but also in unobserved characteristics. In addition, it has a number of advantages over the QTE approach adopted by Havnes and Mogstad (2015) and Bitler et al. (2016): While identifying distributional changes without additional assumptions, QTE identifies the distribution of individual-level treatment effects only under a rank invariance assumption.⁸ Moreover, by relating treatment effects to the participation decision, MTE is informative about the nature of selection into treatment and allows various treatment effects like TT and TUT to be computed.

The only two recent studies we know of that use an MTE framework to estimate heterogeneity in returns to early child care attendance with respect to unobserved characteristics are Kline and Walters (2016) and

⁷ Using a similar approach, Kottelenberg and Lehrer (2017) find substantial heterogeneity in distributional effects for the Quebec Family Policy.

⁸ The rank invariance assumption (or rank preservation; see Elango et al. 2016) is necessary to interpret the QTE as the treatment effect of the individual at the q th quantile of the outcome distribution in the untreated state and implies, as discussed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), that a common unobserved factor determines the ranking of a given person in both the treated and untreated states. The MTE approach, in contrast, allows unobserved factors to differently affect outcomes in the treated and untreated states.

Felfe and Lalive (2018). The former evaluates a targeted child care program (Head Start) with an emphasis on multiple untreated states (i.e., home care vs. other subsidized public child care), whereas the latter examines a younger population of mostly 1- and 2-year-old children. In contrast, we study a universal child care program in which the untreated state is almost exclusively home care and concentrate on 3–4-year-old children who are at the heart of the current policy debate in the United States and Europe.⁹

Our study also contributes to the growing literature that estimates marginal treatment effects in different contexts, most of which has focused on returns to schooling at the college level (see, e.g., Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlačil [2011] for the United States; Balfe [2015] for the United Kingdom; Nybom [2017] for Sweden; and Kaufmann [2014] for Mexico) or secondary school level (e.g., Carneiro et al. 2017), typically producing evidence for a strong self-selection into treatment based on net gains.¹⁰ Our findings, in contrast, show that when someone other than the treatment subject (e.g., the parents or an administrator) decides on enrollment (the intervention), the relation between selection and gains may be reversed so that individuals with the highest enrollment resistance benefit most from the treatment.¹¹

We deviate from the existing MTE literature in the field of education by adopting a tighter identification strategy that exploits variation in the instrument not only across areas (the main variation used in existing studies) but also across cohorts, thus enabling us to control for time-constant unobserved area characteristics. An additional strength is that the exogenous variation from a strong, sustained expansion of child care slots creates common support in the estimated (unconditional) propensity score over virtually the full unit interval. While rare in MTE applications, this is crucial to compute the TT and the TUT, which heavily weight individuals

⁹ In line with our findings and consistent with those of Bitler et al. (2016), Kline and Walters (2016) uncover a pattern of reverse selection on gains for Head Start attendance when the nontreated state is home care. Felfe and Lalive (2018), in contrast, do not find general evidence for reverse selection on gains, possibly because they study the effects of child care attendance for a younger group of children than we do.

¹⁰ In an important exception (in a context other than early child care attendance), Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlačil (2005) find evidence in line with reverse selection on gains in the context of a vocational rehabilitation program in Norway. As in our context, the decision whether to enroll in the program is a joint decision by the caseworker and the individual. The unexpected pattern of reverse selection may be explained by cream-skimming of individuals into training by caseworkers on the basis of their employability rather than their marginal gains from training.

¹¹ The MTE framework has also been applied to measure the marginal treatment effects of foster care on future outcomes (Doyle 2007), heterogeneity in the impacts of comprehensive schools on long-term health behavior (Basu, Jones, and Rosa Dias 2014), and heterogeneity in the effects of disability insurance receipt on labor supply (Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2013; French and Song 2014).

at the extremes of the treatment propensity distribution, without having to extrapolate out of the common support.¹²

The paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the empirical framework and the method for estimating the marginal returns to child care attendance. Sections III and IV describe the data, the main features of the German public child care system, and the child care reform. Section V reports our main findings on treatment effect heterogeneity and its relation to the pattern of selection into treatment. Section VI then offers a possible explanation for the main pattern of findings and discusses policy simulations. Section VII concludes the paper with a discussion of policy implications.

II. Estimating Marginal Returns to Child Care Attendance

A. Baseline Model Setup (Binary Treatment)

We assess the extent and pattern of treatment effect heterogeneity with respect to both observed and unobserved characteristics using the MTE framework (Björklund and Moffitt 1987; Heckman 1997; Heckman and Vytlacil 1999, 2005, 2007). We use Y_{0i} and Y_{1i} to denote the potential outcome (from the school entrance exams) for individual i in the non-treated and the treated state, respectively (with $D_i = 1$ denoting treatment). We model the potential outcomes Y_{ji} as a function of the observed control variables X_i (e.g., child gender, age, and minority status) and dummies for municipality (R_i) and examination cohort (T_i):

$$Y_{ji} = X_i\beta_j + R_i\alpha + T_i\tau + U_{ji}, \quad j = 0, 1. \quad (1)$$

Following Brinch, Mogstad, and Wiswall (2017), we interpret equation (1) as a linear projection of Y_j on (X, R, T) , which implies that by definition, U_j is normalized to $E[U_j|X = x, R = r, T = t] = 0$.¹³

For selection into treatment D_i (defined in our baseline specification as child care attendance for at least 3 years), we use the following latent index model:

¹² For instance, the common support in French and Song (2014) ranges from 0.45 to 0.85 (as depicted by French and Taber [2011]), while that in Felfe and Lalive (2018) ranges between 0 and 0.5. Carneiro et al. (2011), in contrast, achieve nearly full common support by combining four different instruments.

¹³ The coefficient vector, defined as $(\beta_j \ \alpha \ \tau)' = [(X, R, T)'(X, R, T)]^{-1}(X, R, T)'Y_j$, should therefore be interpreted in terms of partial correlations rather than as a causal or structural parameter. Other studies, such as Aakvik et al. (2005) and Carneiro et al. (2011, 2017), instead invoke independence of (X, R, T) and U_j in which case $(\beta_j \ \alpha \ \tau)'$ and U_j are defined as structural or causal.

$$D_i^* = Z_i\beta_d - V_i, \quad (2)$$

$$D_i = 1 \quad \text{if } D_i^* \geq 0, \quad D_i = 0 \quad \text{otherwise,}$$

where $Z = (X, R, T, \tilde{Z})$, implying that Z includes the same covariates (X, R, T) as the outcome equation (1) and an instrument $\tilde{Z}$ excluded from the outcome equation.¹⁴ In our application, $\tilde{Z}$ is local child care supply as measured by the child care coverage rate 3 years prior to the school entrance examination. Because the error term V_i enters the selection equation (2) with a negative sign, it embodies the unobserved characteristics that make individuals less likely to receive treatment. We thus label V_i “unobserved resistance” or “distaste” for treatment.

Equation (1) implies that the individual treatment effect (the difference between the potential outcomes in the treated and untreated states) is given by $Y_{1i} - Y_{0i} = X_i(\beta_1 - \beta_0) + U_{1i} - U_{0i}$. Treatment effect heterogeneity may thus result from both observed (differences between $X_i\beta_1$ and $X_i\beta_0$) and unobserved characteristics (differences between U_{1i} and U_{0i}).¹⁵ A key feature of the MTE approach is that it allows the unobserved gain from treatment ($U_{1i} - U_{0i}$) to be correlated with unobserved characteristics that affect selection (V_i). In the remainder of the exposition, we drop the i index to simplify notation.

In the MTE literature, it is customary to trace out the treatment effect against the quantiles of the distribution of V rather than against its absolute values, in line with the following transformation of the selection rule in equation (2):

$$Z\beta_d - V \geq 0 \Leftrightarrow Z\beta_d \geq V \Leftrightarrow \Phi(Z\beta_d) \geq \Phi(V),$$

with Φ denoting the cumulative distribution function of V (in our application, a standard normal distribution). The term $\Phi(Z\beta_d)$, also denoted by $\Phi(Z\beta_d) \equiv P(Z)$, is the propensity score (the probability that an individual with observed characteristics Z will receive treatment), and $\Phi(V)$, denoted by $\Phi(V) \equiv U_D$, represents the quantiles of the distribution of unobserved resistance to treatment V . The marginal treatment effect as a function of these quantiles can then be expressed as

$$\text{MTE}(X = x, U_D = u_D) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | X = x, U_D = u_D),$$

¹⁴ As Vytlačil (2002) points out, additive separability between $Z\beta_d$ and V_i in the latent index model in eq. (2) implies monotonicity (or more appropriately uniformity): a change of the propensity score from $P(Z)$ to $P(Z')$ shifts individuals either into treatment or out of treatment.

¹⁵ Because the municipality and year dummies are restricted to having the same effect in the treated and untreated outcome equations, they have no influence on the treatment effect. We allow all other covariates in X to have different effects in treated vs. untreated cases except for a set of birth month dummies.

where MTE is the gain from treatment for an individual with observed characteristics $X = x$ who is in the u_D th quantile of the V distribution, implying the individual is indifferent to receiving treatment when having a propensity score $P(Z)$ equal to u_D .

We impose the following assumptions. First, there must be a first stage in which the instrument $\tilde{Z}$ (the child care coverage rate in the municipality) causes variation in the probability of treatment after controlling for (X, R, T) . This relation does indeed exist in our application (see Sec. V.A and table 4). Second, $\tilde{Z}$ must be independent of the unobserved component of the outcome and selection equation conditional on the observed characteristics and the municipality and cohort dummies; that is, $\tilde{Z} \perp (U_0, U_1, V) | (X, R, T)$. This assumption requires that the instrument be as good as randomly assigned conditional on (X, R, T) . It also embodies the exclusion restriction that the child care coverage rate in the municipality 3 years prior to the school entry examination must not directly affect the examination outcome conditional on D_i and (X, R, T) . It further implies that the way in which U_1 and U_0 depend on V (i.e., the MTE curve) must not depend on $\tilde{Z}$. We present evidence supporting the validity of our instrument in Section IV.C. Third, following Brinch et al. (2017), we assume that the marginal treatment effect is additively separable into an observed and an unobserved component:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MTE}(x, u_D) &= E(Y_1 - Y_0 | X = x, U_D = u_D) \\ &= \underbrace{x(\beta_1 - \beta_0)}_{\text{observed component}} + \underbrace{E(U_1 - U_0 | U_D = u_D)}_{\text{unobserved component}}. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Accordingly, the treatment effect heterogeneity resulting from the observed characteristics X affects the intercept of the MTE curve as a function of u_D , but its slope in u_D does not depend on X . This separability is a common feature of empirical MTE applications because it considerably eases the data requirements for estimating the MTE curve.¹⁶ Most importantly, it allows identifying the MTE over the unconditional support of $P(Z)$, jointly generated by the excluded instrument and the covariates, as opposed to the support of $P(Z)$ conditional on $X = x$ (Carneiro et al. 2011).

B. Estimation

We estimate the MTE using the local IV estimator, exploiting the fact that the model described in Section II.A produces the following outcome equation as a function of the observed regressors X and the propensity

¹⁶ The existing literature typically invokes the stronger assumption of full independence between $(X, R, T, \tilde{Z})$, and (U_0, U_1, U_D) (e.g., Aakvik et al. 2005; Carneiro et al. 2011, 2017).

score $P(Z) = E[D = 1|Z]$ (cf. Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlačil 2006; Carneiro et al. 2011):

$$\begin{aligned} E[Y|X = x, R = r, T = t, P(Z) = p] \\ = X\beta_0 + R\alpha + T\tau + X(\beta_1 - \beta_0)p + K(p), \end{aligned}$$

where $K(p)$ is a nonlinear function of the propensity score. As shown by Heckman et al. (2006) and Carneiro et al. (2011), the derivative of this outcome equation with respect to p delivers the MTE for $X = x$ and $U_D = p$:¹⁷

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial E[Y|X = x, P(Z) = p]}{\partial p} &= X(\beta_1 - \beta_0) + \frac{\partial K(p)}{\partial p} \\ &= \text{MTE}(X = x, U_D = p). \end{aligned}$$

We implement this approach by first estimating the treatment selection equation in (2) as a probit model to obtain estimates of the propensity score $\hat{p} = \Phi(Z\hat{\beta}_d)$ and then modeling $K(p)$ as a polynomial in p of degree k and estimating the outcome equation:

$$Y = X\beta_0 + R\alpha + T\tau + X(\beta_1 - \beta_0)\hat{p} + \sum_{k=2}^K \alpha_k \hat{p}^k + \varepsilon. \quad (4)$$

The MTE curve is then the derivative of equation (4) with respect to $\hat{p}$. We assume a second-order polynomial in $\hat{p}$ ($K = 2$) in our baseline specification but generally find similar results for $K = 3$, $K = 4$, and a semiparametric specification of $K(p)$. To assess whether treatment effects vary with the unobserved resistance to treatment, we run tests for the joint significance of the second- and higher-order terms of the polynomial (i.e., the α_k in eq. [4]).¹⁸

The MTE can be aggregated over U_D in different ways to generate several meaningful mean treatment parameters, such as the effect of treatment on the treated (see Heckman and Vytlačil 2005, 2007). In this paper, we compute the unconditional treatment effects by aggregating the

¹⁷ The derivative of the outcome with respect to the observed inducement into treatment (the propensity score) yields the treatment effect for individuals at a given point in the distribution of the unobserved resistance to treatment (U_D) because of the following. First, given a propensity score with the specific value of $p = p_0$, individuals with $U_D < p_0$ are treated while individuals with $U_D = p_0$ are indifferent. If p is increased from p_0 by a small amount dp , previously indifferent individuals with $U_D = p_0$ are shifted into treatment with a marginal treatment effect of $\text{MTE}(U_D = p_0)$. Outcome Y then increases by the share of shifted individuals times their treatment effect, $dY = dp \times \text{MTE}(U_D = p_0)$, and the derivative of Y with respect to dp normalizes dY by dp (the change in the explanatory variable), $dY/dp = \text{MTE}(U_D = p_0)$. The derivative of the outcome with respect to the propensity score thus yields the MTE at $U_D = p$.

¹⁸ We estimate the model using our own modified and extended version of the Stata `margte` command (see Brave and Walstrum 2014).

MTE in equation (3) not only over U_b but also over the appropriate distributions of the covariates (see Cornelissen et al. [2016] for a description of the weights). We report bootstrapped standard errors throughout with clustering at the municipality level.

III. Data

Our main data source is a set of 1994–2006 administrative records for one large region in West Germany, the Weser-Ems region in Lower Saxony.¹⁹ These records, which represent an unusually wide array of results for the school readiness examination administered by licensed pediatricians, cover the full population of school entry-aged children. We combine these data with data on the local supply of child care slots obtained from our own survey, as well as with data on sociodemographic municipality characteristics and local child care quality measures, both computed from social security records. This combination of different data sources produced an extremely rich, high-quality data set that is unavailable for other countries.

A. School Entrance Examination

A unique feature of the German school system is that in the year before entering elementary school, all children undergo a compulsory school entry examination designed to assess their school readiness and identify any developmental delays or health problems needing preventive treatment in the future. Typically administered in a nearby elementary school in the child's municipality between the February and June before August school entry, the 45-minute test, conducted by government pediatricians, includes an interview with the child, as well as a battery of tests of motor skills and physical development. Hence, a major important advantage of our outcomes is that they represent standardized assessments by health professionals rather than subjective assessments by parents, which may be prone to a number of sources of bias.²⁰

Our main variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the pediatrician assesses the child as ready for school entry in the fall. Because the pediatricians base such recommendations on all school entry tests and general observations of the child during the examination, this outcome serves as a summary measure of all readiness assessments. According to official guidelines, delayed school entry is recommended in the case of

¹⁹ The region is mostly rural, and the two largest cities are home to 270,000 and 160,000 inhabitants, respectively.

²⁰ Baker et al. (2008) and Heckman and Kautz (2014) provide a detailed discussion on this issue, and Sandner and Jungmann (2016) show that bias in maternal ratings of early child development is related to socioeconomic status.

major physical, cognitive, or emotional developmental delays and if any therapeutic or special-needs measures will not generate school readiness before the start of school. Similar indicators used to assess school preparedness in the United States have proven to be important predictors for later academic success (e.g., Duncan et al. 2007; Grissmer et al. 2010; Pagani et al. 2010). Since parents and schools almost always comply with the pediatrician's recommendation, deferment from school entry also leads to significant earnings losses later in life through delayed entry into the labor market.²¹ For example, Dustmann, Puhani, and Schönberg (2017) show that in Germany, delayed school entry by 1 year leads to 2.3 percent lower earnings between 30 and 45. Likewise, our own calculations based on the earnings profiles of all men born between 1961 and 1964, discounted to age 3 using a discount factor of 0.97, suggest that delayed school entry lowers lifetime earnings by €16,878 (\$22,397) in 2010 prices.²²

In addition to our central measure of school readiness, we investigate further more specific examination outcomes: a diagnosis of motor skill problems (based on balancing, jumping, and ball exercise tests for body coordination);²³ the logarithm of the child's body mass index (BMI) and a binary indicator for overweight, as two important predictors of adult health (Ebbeling, Pawlak, and Ludwig 2002; Wang et al. 2011); and a physician recommendation for compensatory sport when the child shows any postural or coordination problems, lack of muscular tension, overweight caused by a lack of physical exercise, or psychosomatic developmental problems. For child overweight, we follow the official German pediatric guidelines of a BMI above the 90th percentile of the age- and gender-specific BMI distribution (see Kromeyer-Hauschild et al. 2001). Our data also include the number of years a child has spent in public child care (information rarely available in administrative data sources) but contain parental background information (e.g., education) only from 2001 onward. Therefore, we exploit the latter only in an auxiliary analysis.

From this data set, we sample all children examined for the first time between 1994 and 2002, which are the school entry cohorts most affected

²¹ In 2005, the actual deferment rate in our region was nearly identical to the deferment rate recommended by the pediatrician (author calculations based on data from the Lower Saxony State Office for Statistics [2005]).

²² Available evidence from the United States and Norway is broadly consistent with the findings for Germany. For example, Deming and Dynarski (2008) conclude that "there is substantial evidence that entering school later . . . depresses lifetime earnings (by delaying entry into the labor market)" (72–73). Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2011) examine the effect of school starting age for Norway and show that delaying school entry leads to lower earnings until about age 30.

²³ In our data, motor skill problems take four values depending on the severity of the abnormality. As very severe levels are a rare outcome and the multivalued outcome variable lacks a meaningful cardinal scale (see Cunha and Heckman 2008), we have transformed them into binary outcome variables.

by the child care program expansion (see Sec. IV.B). We further restrict the sample to municipalities for which we have data on available child care slots (see Sec. III.B below), which yields a baseline sample of 135,906 children in 80 municipalities. As table 1, panel A, shows, 51 percent of the children in this final sample attended child care for at least 3 years (our baseline treatment variable).²⁴ Children of immigrant ancestry make up about 12 percent of our sample. Although 91 percent of all the children examined were assessed as ready for immediate school entry, considerable individual heterogeneity is observable in this measure: on the basis of a probit regression using the same covariates as in our baseline specification, predicted school readiness ranges from 0.31 to 1 and is less than 0.79 for 10 percent of children. It should be noted that these numbers capture individual heterogeneity in school readiness based on observed characteristics only: individual heterogeneity based on unobserved characteristics is likely to be even larger. Regarding the other outcomes, 85 percent of the children showed no lack of motor skills, 82 percent had no need for compensatory sport, and only 8 percent of the children could be classified as overweight.

We provide additional information on minority children in panel B of table 1. Thirty-five percent of minority children are ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union whose parents arrived in Germany mostly in the early 1990s after the breakdown of the Eastern European communist regimes. Children of Turkish descent form the second-largest minority group, making up roughly 30 percent of minority children in our sample. While both minority groups come from less educated family backgrounds than German children, children of Turkish origin are more disadvantaged and are less likely to speak German at home with at least one family member than children from the former Soviet Union, even though the Turkish arrived in Germany predominantly in the 1960s and 1970s.²⁵

B. Data on Child Care Slots

We supplement the school entrance examination data with information on the number of child care slots available in each year and municipality, collected individually from regional youth welfare offices for lack of a central source. For the handful of municipalities that could not provide us with such information, we successfully contacted all child care centers in the municipality via email and telephone interviews. Overall, we were

²⁴ Only 5.6 percent of the children in our sample attended child care for longer than 3 years, so the vast majority (88 percent) of treated children attended child care for 3 years.

²⁵ See Casey and Dustmann (2008) for additional evidence on language usage of minority groups in Germany.

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Estimate
A. Individual characteristics:	
Treatment variable:	
Child care attendance for at least 3 years	.51
Selected covariates:	
Minority	.12
Female	.49
Age at examination in months	74.68
Outcomes:	
School readiness	.91
Predicted school readiness:	
Minimum	.31
5th percentile	.74
10th percentile	.79
25th percentile	.87
50th percentile	.93
75th percentile	.97
90th percentile	.98
Motor skills	.85
No compensatory sport required	.82
BMI	15.61
Overweight (BMI > 90th percentile)	.08
B. Characteristics of minority/majority groups:	
Mother has no postsecondary education:	
Majority (German origin)	.07
Former Soviet Union (35% of minority children)	.28
Turkish (31% of minority children)	.57
Mother has college degree:	
Majority (German origin)	.37
Former Soviet Union	.34
Turkish	.15
German spoken with at least one family member (Family Survey):	
Former Soviet Union	.44
Turkish	.38
C. Child care quality indicators:	
Child-to-staff ratio (median)	9.44
Share of high educated among staff	.09
Share of male staff	.02

SOURCE.—Authors' calculation based on the following data sets. Panel A: School entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002. Panel B: School entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 2001–3, and information of German spoken with at least one family member (father, mother, or grandparents) from the Special Survey on Russian and Turkish children for Children Longitudinal Study from the German Youth Institute (DJI), Munich, 2003. The sample refers to 8- and 9-year-old children of the former Soviet Union ($N = 262$) and of Turkish origin ($N = 256$) in 2003. Panel C: Social security records, Weser-Ems, 1990–98, 18–65-year-olds.

NOTE.—Panel A reports sample means of early child care attendance (our treatment variable), of selected child characteristics, and of child outcomes in our sample. Panel B compares sample means of maternal education between majority children and children of Turkish origin and from the Soviet Union. In addition, it reports the share of children of Turkish origin and from the Soviet Union origin who speak primarily German with at least one family member, based on data from the Children Longitudinal Survey. Panel C displays sample means of child care quality indicators at the municipality level, referring to when the child was 3 years old.

able to gather detailed information on child care provision during 1990–2003 for 81 of the 118 municipalities in our data set, encompassing around 77 percent of all the children examined.

C. Sociodemographic Municipality Characteristics and Local Child Care Quality

We also supplement the examination information with yearly data on local sociodemographic and child care quality characteristics measured at the municipality level. Municipality characteristics include the number of inhabitants, median wage, and the share of individuals with medium and tertiary education in the workforce, as well as the share of immigrants and women in the workforce obtained either from the statistical office of Lower Saxony or computed from social security records on all men and women covered by the social security system in the region. Local child care quality indicators are derived from social security records on all child care teachers employed in the region with a focus on two characteristics identified as central to child care program success (cf. Walters 2015): class size and teacher education (see, e.g., Chetty et al. 2011). We also consider the presence of male child care teachers, which is allowed to affect outcomes differently by gender. The summary characteristics of the child care quality measures, reported in table 1, panel C, reveal a median child-to-staff ratio of 9.4, an average share of 9 percent of child care teachers with a university degree, and a male staff share of 2 percent.²⁶

IV. Background

A. Child Care Provision in Germany

To facilitate interpretation of our findings, we first briefly outline the main elements of formal child care provision for 3–6-year-olds in Germany, which is almost exclusively public. As in other countries, the German universal child care program is a half-day program with strict nationwide quality standards: the student-teacher ratio must not exceed 25 children per two teachers and teachers must have completed at least a 2-year state-certified vocational program followed by a 1-year internship as a child care teacher. Other regulations govern the space provided for each child and learning goals pursued by the centers. Overall, these standards lead to a relatively homogeneous child care environment compared to, for example, the United States.

²⁶ Child care teachers in Germany mostly have a vocational degree, which is equivalent to a community college degree in the United States. University degrees among child care workers are less common, so the 9 percent of staff with a university degree are likely to be center managers.

In terms of quality standards, Germany occupies an intermediate position in the international context: the 12.5:1 student-teacher ratio lies between the 8:1 ratio for 3–7-year-olds in UK center-based programs, the maximum ratio of 10:1 in the US Head Start program, and the 25:1 ratio in French programs (OECD 2006). As of 2002, the estimated annual expenditure per child in Germany was \$4,998, comparable to that of other continental European universal child care programs (e.g., \$4,512 in France, \$4,923 in the Netherlands) but well below high-quality intensive programs like Head Start, which invests about \$7,200 per child (OECD 2005, 2006).

As in most universal child care programs, the majority of children in Germany (over 90 percent) attend child care part-time for 4 hours in the morning.²⁷ Most children start child care in August with the start of the new “preschool year,” and once enrolled, nearly all children remain in child care until school entry at the age of 6. As is typical for the age group considered, learning is mostly informal and play oriented and is carried out in the context of day-to-day social interactions between children and teachers. Like the US HighScope (Ypsilanti, Michigan) program or UK Early Years Foundation Stage (see Samuelsson, Sheridan, and Williams [2006] and the Department for Education [2014] for descriptions), the programs emphasize as their main learning goals personal and emotional development, social skills, the development of cognitive abilities and positive attitudes toward learning, physical development, creative development, and language and communication skills. An important additional element of German formal child care (and similar programs) is communication with parents to inform them about their children’s developmental and learning progress and provide them with educational guidance.

B. The Child Care Expansion Policy

In Germany, child care for children aged 3–6 is heavily subsidized, with parental fees covering, on average, only about 10 percent of the overall child care costs and the remainder shared by the municipality and state government. Until the early 1990s, however, legal definitions of how the state and local municipalities should share child care provision responsibilities were vague and subsidies for the creation of formal child care slots were limited. As a result, such slots were severely rationed and existing slots were always filled. Waiting lists existed at all child care centers and were long. At this time, open slots were primarily allocated according to the child’s age—so 3-year-olds were the most affected by the ration-

²⁷ This calculation is based on data from the *Statistical Report on Child Care Institutions* from the Lower Saxony State Office for Statistics (2004, 19).

ing—and the mother's labor force status, with children of working mothers given priority over children of nonworking mothers. If two children were of the same age and their mothers were both working, the application date and time on the waiting lists were the decisive factors. Then, in August 1992, after the burden imposed on families by low child care availability had dominated the political discussion for well over a year, the federal government introduced a legal mandate that by January 1, 1996, every child would be guaranteed a subsidized 4-hour slot from the third birthday until school entry. Although slot provision would be the responsibility of the residential municipality, the state would provide generous financial aid for the construction and running of child care facilities. Municipalities with relatively lower child care coverage rates would be eligible for the highest subsidies. Despite these subsidies, however, creating child care slots imposed too many constraints on municipalities, so the introduction of the legal mandate by January 1, 1996, was no longer considered feasible. Consequently, the state government of Lower Saxony allowed exceptions until December 31, 1998.

Overall, between 1992 and 2002, around 11,000 new child care slots were created for children aged 3–6 in the 80 municipalities in our sample (an increase of close to 40 percent). Part A of figure 1 depicts a box plot of the evolution of the child care coverage rate, computed as the number of available child care slots in a municipality 3 years prior to the school entry examination (i.e., when the child was approximately aged 3), divided by the number of 3–6-year-old children living in that municipality at that time. Average coverage across municipalities increases strongly from 0.59 slot per eligible child in the 1994 examination cohort to just over 0.8 slot for those in the 2002 examination cohort. The box plot also shows that there is a substantial range of cross-sectional variation in the coverage rate of around 30–40 percentage points around the annual means. Across all years, the overall coverage rate ranges from below 40 percent at the start of the expansion to close to 100 percent at the end of the expansion period. Part B of figure 1 plots the proportion of children who attended child care for 1, 2, or (at least) 3 years for the 1994–2002 examination cohorts. The figure reveals that the expansion in child care slots mostly increased the 3-year attendance rate (i.e., enrollment at age 3) and reduced the 2-year attendance rate (i.e., enrollment at age 4)—as we would expect since prior to the expansion preference was given to older children when demand was excessive. Among children in the 1994 examination cohort (who would have entered child care at the earliest in 1991 before child care expansion), around 41 percent attended for the full 3 years. For children examined in 2002, who benefited fully from the child care extension, the 3-year attendance rate rose to 67 percent, an increase of nearly 63 percent compared to 1994. This observation




FIG. 1.—Evolution of child care coverage and child care attendance. Part A, Child care coverage rate. Part B, Distribution of years of child care attendance by cohort. Part A shows the evolution of the child care coverage rate (our instrument) computed as the number of available child care slots in a municipality 3 years prior to the school entry examination (i.e., at approximately age 3 of the child), divided by the number of 3–6-year-old children living in that municipality at that time. The figure shows the annual mean (connected line), median (horizontal bar), 25th and 75th percentiles (edges of the boxes), as well as 5th and 95th percentiles (whiskers), all computed at the individual child level (population-weighted). Part B shows the accompanying changes in the distribution of the years of child care attendance by cohort. Source: Child care coverage rate: Own calculations based on data on child care slot availability by year and municipality obtained from own data survey and number of 3–6-year-olds living in the municipality provided by Statistical Office of Lower Saxony. Attendance rates: School entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002.

motivates our decision to define treatment in our baseline specification as attending child care for 3 years (or “attending child care early”).

Although the expansion in child care slots primarily shifted children from attending child care for 2 years to attending child care for 3 years, part B also reveals a drop in the share attending for 1 year, from 15 percent for the 1994 examination cohort to 6 percent for the 2002 examination cohort. Therefore, the expansion also induced some children to attend child care for 2 (or more) years rather than 1 year only.²⁸ In Section V.F, we explicitly take into account the multivalued nature of our treatment and distinguish between attending child care for 1, 2, or 3 years.

C. *Exogeneity of the Child Care Expansion*

Because the child care expansion was staggered across time and municipalities, in the empirical analysis we are able to exploit sharp shifts in the supply within municipalities across nearby cohorts. Specifically, we use the child care coverage rate in $t - 3$ (3 years before the school entry exam at approximately age 3 when parents decide to enroll their child in early child care) as an instrument for early child care attendance conditional on municipality and cohort dummies, thereby accounting for time-constant differences across municipalities (such as residential sorting). This identification strategy is tighter than typically adopted in the MTE literature on returns to schooling, which mainly employs spatial variation in instruments.

For the instrument to be valid, the timing and intensity of the child care expansion must be as good as random (cf. the second assumption discussed in Sec. II.A). In column 1 of table 2, we obtain an initial picture of which municipalities in our sample experienced an above-average 1994–2002 expansion in child care slots by regressing the change in child care coverage between 1991 and 1999 (i.e., from our 1994 [oldest] cohort’s child care attendance in $t - 3$ to our 2002 [youngest] cohort’s attendance) on the initial coverage rate in 1991. As expected, the change in child care supply is strongly negatively related to its baseline availability, reflecting both the higher state subsidies received by municipalities with lower initial coverage rates and the greater political pressure they felt to expand availability relative to municipalities with higher initial coverage rates. Then, in column 2, we add a number of baseline (1990) municipality characteristics, including the median wage and the shares of medium and highly skilled individuals in the workforce. Reassuringly, only one of these baseline characteristics helps to predict the size of the child care ex-

²⁸ The nonattendance rate, in contrast, remained roughly constant, suggesting that the expansion did not shift children into child care who previously had not attended at all.

TABLE 2
DETERMINANTS OF THE CHILD CARE EXPANSION

	(1)	(2)
Initial coverage rate	-.437** (.175)	-.478** (.190)
Median wage level		.000 (.002)
Share of high educated		.010 (.011)
Share of medium educated		.003 (.003)
Number of inhabitants (in 1,000s)		.0001 (.000)
Share of immigrants in workforce		.014** (.007)
Share of women in workforce		-.0002 (.002)
Constant	.172*** (.016)	.202*** (.026)
<i>p</i> -value for joint significance of other covariates (excluding initial coverage rate)		.1855

SOURCE.—Child care coverage rate: Own calculations based on (a) data on child care slot availability by year and municipality obtained from own data survey and (b) number of 3–6-year-olds living in the municipality provided by Statistical Office of Lower Saxony. Median wage, educational shares, share of immigrants, and women in workforce: Social security records, Weser-Ems, 1990–98, 18–65-year-olds. Number of inhabitants: Statistical Office of Lower Saxony.

NOTE.—The table investigates the determinants of the expansion in child care slots in the municipality, by regressing the change in the child care coverage rate in the municipality between examination cohorts 1994 and 2001 on the initial coverage rate for the 1994 cohort (col. 1) and baseline municipality characteristics (col. 2). The child care coverage rate is measured 3 years prior to the school entry examination (i.e., when the cohort is approximately aged 3). In municipalities where information for 1994 or 2001 was missing, we use the adjacent cohort. The last row reports the *p*-value for the hypothesis that municipality characteristics at the baseline are jointly equal to zero. All coefficients on shares refer to 1 percentage point changes in these shares. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.

* Statistically significant at the .10 level.

** Statistically significant at the .05 level.

*** Statistically significant at the .01 level.

pansion in the municipality (and jointly they are insignificant). Further, the initial coverage rate remains strongly correlated with the expansion intensity. However, even if the municipality characteristics at baseline did predict child care expansion in the municipality, it would not generally invalidate our identification strategy because these characteristics at baseline mostly reflect time-constant differences, which are accounted for by the inclusion of municipality dummies in our estimation.

In addition to exploiting across-municipality variation in expansion intensity, we also investigate whether the timing of the creation of child care slots is quasi-random. To do so, we regress the child care coverage rates per 3–6-year-old in $t - 3$, our instrument, on sociodemographic municipi-

pality characteristics measured in $t - 4$ (i.e., 1 year prior to the measurement of child care availability, to account for the fact that the effect of socioeconomic characteristics on the expansion is unlikely to be instantaneous) while conditioning on municipality and cohort dummies. As table 3 shows, none of the municipality characteristics is statistically significant, and changes in the municipality's socioeconomic characteristics appear to be uncorrelated with changes in the child care supply. Hence, the

TABLE 3
BALANCING TESTS

Variable	Estimate
Age	-.00001 (.0001)
Age squared	.00000 (.0020)
Female	-.0003 (.0002)
Minority child	-.00003 (.0005)
Median wage level	.002 (.001)
Share of high educated	.009 (.011)
Share of medium educated	-.002 (.002)
Number of inhabitants (in 1,000s)	.000 (.003)
Share of immigrants in workforce	.003 (.006)
Share of women working	.004 (.003)
Municipality dummies	Yes
Cohort dummies	Yes
<i>p</i> -value for joint significance of covariates	.254

SOURCE.—Child care coverage rate: Own calculations based on (a) data on child care slot availability by year and municipality obtained from own data survey and (b) number of 3–6-year-olds living in the municipality provided by Statistical Office of Lower Saxony. Individual characteristics: School entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002. Median wage, educational shares, share of immigrants, and women in workforce: Social security records, Weser-Ems, 1990–98, 18–65-year-olds. Number of inhabitants: Statistical Office of Lower Saxony.

NOTE.—The table reports coefficients from regressions of the instrument (the child care coverage rate) on individual and municipality-level covariates measured in the previous period, conditional on municipality and cohort dummies. The child care coverage rate is measured 3 years prior to the school entry examination (i.e., when the cohort is approximately aged 3). The last row reports the *p*-value for the hypothesis that the covariates are jointly equal to zero. All coefficients on shares refer to 1 percentage point changes in these shares. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.

results in both table 2 and table 3 support our identifying assumption that both the intensity and timing of new child care slot creation are plausibly exogenous. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we also report results from a specification that exploits solely variation across municipalities in the intensity, but not the timing, of child care slot creation (see Sec. V.E).

Another threat to identification is the possibility that child care expansion could crowd out other public expenditure or reduce household income, which might negatively affect child outcomes. Two factors limit this concern: because income taxes are set at the federal level, municipalities could not increase them to finance the increased child care expenditure; and because social and unemployment benefits are regulated at the federal level, they are independent of local government finances. An additional threat is that child care expansion might negatively change child care quality, affecting not only children pulled into child care by the creation of new slots but also those whose child care attendance is unaffected. To assess this possibility, in our baseline specification, we condition on the child care quality measures available in our data, including child-teacher ratio, teacher education, and teacher gender. We find that excluding the child care quality measures has little effect on our results (see Sec. V.E). A final threat is endogenous mobility: families with strong preferences for early child care attendance may move to municipalities with a larger supply of child care. In our sample, however, this bias is unlikely to be a concern, not only because only 4.4 percent of the families moved to a new municipality in the 2 years prior to the examination but also because the mobility rate is uncorrelated with changes in municipal child care availability.²⁹

V. Results

A. *First-Stage Selection Equation*

We display the parameter estimates for the first-stage probit selection equation (2) in column 1 of table 4.³⁰ To allow for the possibility that at

²⁹ Regressing the share of families that moved to a new municipality during the previous 2 years on the number of available child care slots as measured by the coverage rate (our instrument) yields a small and statistically insignificant coefficient. Specifically, the point estimate suggests that a 10 percent increase in the coverage rate decreases the mobility rate by 0.4 percent (standard error 0.29 percent), providing no evidence of selective migration based on child care availability. Results when using changes in the number of 0–3-year-old children in $t - 3$ as an alternative dependent variable are very similar.

³⁰ We additionally control for a quadratic in age at examination; dummies for year, municipality, and birth month; time-variant municipality characteristics (median wage, educational shares, number of inhabitants, share of immigrants, share of women in the workforce) in $t - 4$; and child care quality indicators (above-median child-to-staff ratio, share of university graduates among child care staff, male staff share interacted with child gender) in $t - 3$.

high levels of coverage, when excess demand eases, the likelihood of filling an additional slot may decrease, we use as instruments not only the child care coverage rate (centered around its mean) in the municipality 3 years prior to the examination but also its square. We further interact our instruments with individual child care characteristics (minority status, gender, and age) to allow for the possibility that the expansion primarily draws in children of a particular observed type. Our results remain largely unchanged when we do not interact our instruments with individual characteristics or use only the coverage rate in the municipality, but not its square, as an instrument (see cols. 2 and 3 of table 5 and Sec. V.E).

To ease interpretation, we report in the table marginal effects only for the noninteracted terms of the coverage rate (referring to a German boy of average age), and we illustrate the effects of the interaction terms by plotting the predicted probability of selection into early child care (i.e., the propensity score) as a function of the child care coverage rate by minority status and gender in figure 2. The child care coverage rate is a strong predictor of early child care attendance, and as expected, the coefficients on the linear and squared terms of the instrument reveal a concave relation between the child care supply at the time the child care decision was made and the decision to enroll early.³¹

The heterogeneity in the first stage by gender and minority status depicted in figure 2 shows that differences by gender are comparatively small, with girls having a slightly higher propensity to attend child care early but few noticeable gender differences in the slope of the curve. There are, however, strong differences by minority status. At all levels of the coverage rate, minority children have a 20–30 percentage point lower propensity for early child care attendance. Moreover, at lower values of the coverage rate, the curve for minority children has a steeper slope, implying that the expansion of available child care initially shifted minority children into child care more strongly than it did majority children. In contrast, at higher values of

³¹ Since the coverage rate used in table 4 is centered around its mean, the coefficients of the quadratic in the coverage rate in col. 1 of table 4 suggest a turning point at 0.75 ($0.331/(2 \times 0.22)$) above the mean of the coverage rate of 0.68 . The turning point after which additional child care slots shift children out of early child care therefore occurs at 1.43 ($0.75 + 0.68$), which is out of the support of the coverage rate in our sample. It should further be noted that the concave shape of $P(Z)$ in Z does not violate the monotonicity (or, more appropriately, as suggested by Heckman et al. [2006], uniformity) assumption. The IV uniformity assumption requires that for a given pair of values z and z' of the instrument, the effect on the treatment probability of changing the instrument from z to z' has the same sign for all individuals whose participation decision is affected by that change. It is thus a condition across individuals at fixed pairs of values of the instrument, and not an assumption on the functional form of $P(Z)$ in Z across values of Z . We find little evidence to suggest that the expansion has shifted individuals out of the treatment to any important extent. When predicting the marginal effect of Z on $P(Z)$ at the individual covariate values of each individual in the sample, marginal effects are negative only for 1.6 percent of individuals in the sample.

TABLE 4
SELECTION EQUATION AND SCHOOL READINESS OUTCOME EQUATION

	Selection Equation Child Care ≥ 3 Years (1)	Outcome Equation School Readiness (2)	Selection Equation Child Care ≥ 3 Years (3)	Outcome Equation School Readiness (4)
Child care coverage rate	.331*** (.043)		.331*** (.042)	
Child care coverage rate squared	-.220** (.108)		-.220** (.108)	
Female	.014*** (.003)	.092*** (.009)	.014*** (.003)	.092*** (.009)
Minority	-.198*** (.011)	-.120*** (.020)		
Turkish			-.207*** (.019)	-.199*** (.031)
Ethnic Germans (former Soviet Union)			-.213*** (.015)	-.073*** (.024)
Other minorities			-.178*** (.010)	-.144*** (.028)
Propensity score		-.135 (.115)		-.170 (.131)
Propensity score squared		.215** (.099)		.205* (.105)
Female $\times$ propensity score		-.086*** (.014)		-.085*** (.015)
Minority $\times$ propensity score		.117*** (.035)		

Turkish $\times$ propensity score					.201*** (.065)
Ethnic Germans (former Soviet Union) $\times$ propensity score					.063 (.043)
Other minority $\times$ propensity score					.143*** (.041)
χ^2 for test of excluded instruments	56.83		72.71		
p-value for test of excluded instruments	.0000		.0000		
p-value for test of heterogeneity		.029			
Observations	135,906	135,906	135,906		.051 135,906

SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

NOTE.—Columns 1 and 3 report average marginal effects from probit selection models in which the dependent variable is equal to one if the child attends public child care for at least 3 years (“first stage”). The child care coverage rate (our instrument) is measured relative to its overall mean. The instrument in the probit selection equation is interacted with individual characteristics (age, gender, ethnic minority status); interaction terms are not shown to save space, but the heterogeneous effect by minority status and gender is depicted in fig. 2. The coefficients on the child care coverage rate refer to a German boy of average age. Columns 2 and 4 display estimates from the outcome equation (see eq. [4] in the text), where the dependent variable is an indicator variable for school readiness. Coefficients of regressors not interacted with the propensity score measure effects on the outcome in the untreated state (i.e., β_0 in eq. [4]), whereas coefficients of regressors interacted with the propensity score measure the difference of the effects between the treated and the untreated state ($\beta_1 - \beta_0$ in eq. [4]). In cols. 3 and 4 we further allow the effects of early child care attendance to differ between the two main minority groups in our sample: children of Turkish descent and children from the former Soviet Union. Further included controls not displayed in the table are age and age squared and time-varying municipality sociodemographic characteristics in $t - 4$ as well as child care quality indicators in $t - 3$, each interacted with the propensity score, as well as cohort dummies, municipality dummies, and birth month dummies (not interacted with the propensity score). Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.

* Statistically significant at the .10 level.

** Statistically significant at the .05 level.

*** Statistically significant at the .01 level.

TABLE 5
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

	Baseline (1)	Noninteracted (2)	Noninteracted, Linear (3)	Semiparametric First Stage (4)	Initial Coverage Rate IV (5)	Long Difference (6)	Birth Months Jan.-June (7)	Age Dummies (8)	No Quality Controls (9)
ATE	.059 (.072)	.050 (.069)	.045 (.072)	.035 (.031)	.130 (.105)	-.005 (.084)	.114 (.092)	.048 (.073)	.073 (.072)
TT	-.051 (.080)	-.070 (.085)	-.071 (.092)	-.066 (.048)	.008 (.109)	-.152 (.118)	-.020 (.128)	-.053 (.084)	-.072 (.082)
TUT	.173** (.085)	.176** (.083)	.165** (.082)	.140*** (.046)	.251** (.120)	.160 (.113)	.219** (.106)	.154* (.093)	.223*** (.082)
p-value of test for essential heterogeneity	.029	.031	.054	.017	.028	.074	.119	.092	.008
Observations	135,906	135,906	135,906	135,906	146,522	56,942	66,865	135,906	135,906

SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

NOTE.—The table reports, for our main outcome variable of school readiness, the average treatment effect (ATE), the treatment effect on the treated (TT), the treatment effect on the untreated (TUT), and the p-value for a test of essential heterogeneity for various alternative specifications. Column 1 refers to the baseline regression from col. 2 in table 4. In col. 2, the instrument is not interacted with covariates in the selection equation, and in col. 3 the instrument is not interacted and the quadratic term of the instrument is dropped. In col. 4, the first stage is estimated semiparametrically. This is done by creating 14 dummies to indicate 5 percentage point bins of the instrument and 20 dummies indicating 5 percentile bins of a linear index in the covariates and regressing the treatment indicator on the full set of interactions among all of these dummies. In col. 5, the instrument is the initial child care coverage rate (for the oldest cohort in our data) interacted with cohort dummies (and gender, minority status, and age, as in our baseline specification). Column 6 exploits only variation across municipalities in the intensity of the child care expansion and restricts the analysis to the (pooled) oldest and youngest examination cohorts, 1994/95 vs. 2001/2. In col. 7, the sample is restricted to children born in the first half of the calendar year, and in col. 8, monthly age dummies instead of a quadratic in age are included as controls. In col. 9, child care quality controls are not included in the regressions. The reported p-value for a test of heterogeneity is a test for a nonzero slope of the MTE curve (see also Sec. II.B). Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.

* Statistically significant at the .10 level.

** Statistically significant at the .05 level.

*** Statistically significant at the .01 level.




FIG. 2.—Propensity score $P(Z)$ as a function of the child care coverage rate (Z) by gender and minority status. The graph displays, using the same specification as in column 1 of table 4, the propensity score predicted from a probit regression as a function of the child care coverage rate (Z) by minority status and gender, holding all other control variables at mean values. Source: Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

the coverage rate, additional increases in child care slots have no effect on minority children, although they still have a moderate effect on majority children.

The first stage generates a large common support for the propensity score $P(Z)$, which ranges from 0.01 to 0.96 (fig. 3).³² The figure shows the unconditional support jointly generated by variation of both the instruments and the covariates, which is sufficient to identify the MTE under the assumption commonly made in MTE applications that the shape of the MTE curve does not vary with covariates (see eq. [3]). Consider figure 2 for an illustration. The figure shows that the instrument alone induces variation in the propensity score $P(Z)$ between 0.35 and 0.65 for majority children and between 0.1 and 0.35 for minority children. Therefore, the joint variation of minority status and of the instrument can alone account for variation in $P(Z)$ between 0.1 and 0.65. The remaining support (up to the full range from 0.01 to 0.96) is generated by additional joint variation of the instrument and the other covariates.

³² The large common support is not due to using the coverage rate squared as an additional instrument, nor is it driven by the interactions with our instruments and the covariates. The unconditional support does not change when only the coverage rate is used as an instrument; see fig. A1 in app. A.




FIG. 3.—Common support. The figure plots the frequency distribution of the propensity score by treatment status. The propensity score is predicted from the baseline first-stage regression in column 1 of table 4. Source: Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

B. *Treatment Effect Heterogeneity in Observed Child Characteristics*

In column 2 of table 4, we report estimates, based on equation (4), for the effects of early child care attendance on our main outcome of school readiness. The results point to an equalizing effect of early child care attendance on the outcomes of children with different observed characteristics. Most important, in the untreated state, minority children are about 12 percentage points less likely than majority children to be assessed as ready for immediate school entry (see the coefficient on minority, which refers to β_0 in eq. [4]). At the same time, their treatment effect is about 12 percentage points higher than that of majority students (see the minority $\times$ propensity score coefficient, which refers to $\beta_1 - \beta_0$ in eq. [4]). This latter observation implies that attending child care early helps minority children to catch up fully with majority children in terms of school readiness. A similar pattern emerges with respect to gender. When attending child care for fewer than 3 years, boys are less likely than girls to be assessed as ready for school. This disadvantage disappears for those who attend child care for at least 3 years.

In columns 3 and 4 of table 4, we further allow the effects of early child care attendance to differ between the two main minority groups in our sample: children of Turkish descent and children from the former Soviet

Union. Both minority groups are about 20 percentage points less likely to attend early child care than majority children (col. 3). In the untreated state, both minority groups are more disadvantaged in terms of school readiness than majority children but are fully able to catch up with majority children if they attend child care early. Interestingly, the initial disadvantage and hence the catch-up are larger for children of Turkish origin, who also come from less educated family backgrounds and are less likely to speak German at home with a family member than children from the former Soviet Union (see panel B of table 1).

In sum, the overall results in table 4 show that groups that benefit more from early child care attendance—that is, boys and particularly minority children—have a lower propensity to enroll in child care early. This observation points to a pattern of reverse selection on gains in terms of observed characteristics.

C. *Marginal Treatment Effects and Summary Treatment Effect Measures*

Part A of figure 4 provides evidence of a similar reverse selection on gains in terms of unobserved characteristics. The figure shows the MTE curve described by equation (2) for mean values of X in our sample and relates the unobserved components of the treatment effect on school readiness, $U_1 - U_0$, and the unobserved component of treatment choice, U_d . Because higher values of U_d imply lower probabilities of treatment, U_d can be interpreted as resistance to enrolling early. The MTE curve increases with this resistance, mimicking the pattern of reverse selection on gains found for observed child characteristics. Thus, on the basis of unobserved characteristics, children who are most likely to enroll in child care early appear to benefit the least from early child care attendance, a pattern of heterogeneity (slope of the MTE curve) that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (see the p -value for the test of heterogeneity at the bottom of col. 2 of table 4).

Interestingly, for the 40 percent of children who are most likely to attend child care for 3 years or more ($U_d < 0.4$), the returns to child care in terms of school readiness are negative albeit not statistically significant (see fig. 4, part A). In contrast, children with a higher resistance to enrolling in child care early show returns that are not only positive but statistically significant for the 30 percent of children with the highest resistance to treatment ($U_d > 0.7$).

In column 1 of table 5, on the basis of the same specification as used in figure 4, part A, we derive the standard treatment parameters ATE (average treatment effect), TT (effect of treatment on the treated), and TUT (effect of treatment on the untreated) by appropriately aggregating over the MTE curve. The ATE of 0.059, computed as an equally weighted aver-




FIG. 4.—MTE curves for school readiness. Part A: MTE curve at average values of the covariates. Part B: MTE curves and weights for the treated and untreated. Part C: MTE curve and weights for individuals shifted by the instrument. Part A depicts the MTE curve for school readiness based on the specification in columns 1 and 2 in table 4 and evaluated at mean values of the covariates. The 90 percent confidence interval is based on bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Part B displays the MTE curves evaluated at covariate means for treated and untreated individuals and the associated weights to compute the treatment effects on the treated and on the untreated (see sec. 4.4 in Cornelissen et al. [2016]). Part C plots the MTE curve evaluated at covariate means of those children who are shifted into early child care in response to changes in the instrument and the associated weights to compute the IV effect (see app. C in Cornelissen et al. [2016]). The two horizontal lines refer to the IV (2SLS) effect estimated from our data (dashed line) and aggregated over the MTE curve (dotted line). Source: Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

age over the MTE curve in figure 4, part A, evaluated at mean values of X , implies that for a child picked at random from the population of children, attending child care early raises the probability of being recommended for elementary school entrance without delay by 5.9 percentage points. The estimated parameter is, however, not significantly different from zero.

To compute the TT and TUT, respectively, we aggregate over the MTE curves evaluated at the X 's of the treated and untreated (see eq. [28] and accompanying text in Cornelissen et al. [2016] for a derivation of the weights). The MTE curve at the X 's of the untreated lies above the MTE curve at the X 's of the treated (depicted in fig. 4, part B), reflecting the reverse selection on gains based on observed child characteristics documented in table 4. The figure also displays the weights applied to these curves to compute the TT and TUT, respectively. Whereas the

TT gives most weight to low values of U_d (since individuals with low resistance to treatment are more likely to be treated), the TUT gives most weight to high values of U_d (because individuals with high resistance to treatment are more likely to be untreated).

Our findings for the TT suggest that for the average treated child, treatment results in a 5 percentage point lower probability of a recommendation to enter school without delay. Like the ATE, however, this effect is not statistically different from zero. For the average untreated child, in contrast, attending child care for 3 years or more increases the probability of immediate school readiness by over 17 percentage points, an effect that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This sizable effect is approximately equal to a move from the 5th to the 50th percentile of the school readiness distribution predicted from the observed characteristics (the percentiles reported in table 1).

D. IV Estimates

As Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007) demonstrate, IV estimates, like ATE, TT, and TUT, can be represented as weighted averages over the MTE curve, with the weights dependent on the type of individuals who change treatment status in response to changes in the instrument. We plot these weights in figure 4, part C, which also displays the MTE curve evaluated at the covariate values for children who changed treatment status in response to changes in the instrument (see eq. [30] in Cornelissen et al. [2016] for exact calculations). The IV estimator gives the largest weight to children with intermediate resistance to early child care attendance. When applying these weights to the MTE curve, we obtain a weighted effect of 0.06 (dotted horizontal line in part C), which is close to the linear IV effect of 0.07 (dashed horizontal line) obtained from the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. This closeness of results is reassuring and can be considered a specification check for the shape of the MTE curve. However, conventional IV estimates, in addition to masking considerable heterogeneity in the response to treatment, are difficult to interpret because of the continuous nature of the instrument, especially in a difference-in-difference setting like ours.³³

³³ As explained in detail in Cornelissen et al. (2016), the 2SLS estimator may be viewed as a weighted average of local average treatment effects across $r - r'$ pairs, when group indicator dummies R_i are used as instruments. The overall IV estimate is therefore representative for compliers at all values of the instrument, with different weights attached to the groups of compliers at different pairs of values. In a difference-in-difference-IV setting like ours, de Chaisemartin (2013) and de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2018) show that strong restrictions on treatment effect heterogeneity are required to identify a well-defined average of the underlying heterogeneous treatment effects.

E. Robustness Checks

The basic pattern of reverse selection on gains documented above is robust to a number of further alternative specifications. First, we relax the assumption, implied by a linear MTE curve, that returns to treatment either increase or decrease monotonically with resistance to enrollment in treatment. Accordingly, in figure 5, we depict MTE curves based on specifications that include a cubic and quartic of the propensity score in equation (4), enabling richer patterns such as a U-shaped MTE curve. These curves also increase monotonically with resistance to early child care enrollment, with a shape that is generally similar to our baseline linear MTE curve. A monotonically rising MTE curve is also observable using a semiparametric approach.³⁴ Hence, the basic shape of the MTE curve is a robust phenomenon independent of the particular functional form.

In table 5, we report additional robustness checks that assume a linear MTE curve like that in our baseline specification. In column 2, we do not interact the child care coverage rate in the municipality with covariates in the first-stage regression, and in column 3, we further omit the quadratic term of the child care coverage rate. In column 4, we report results when estimating the first stage semiparametrically.³⁵ This is an important robustness check since misspecification in the estimated propensity score can lead to bias in the MTE curve.³⁶ Our findings remain unchanged. In column 5, the instrument is the initial child care coverage rate in 1991 (when the oldest cohort in our sample was 3 years old) interacted with cohort dummies. This specification thus uses only the variation in child care supply across municipalities and over time, which can be explained by the predetermined degree of rationing at baseline, a key predictor of municipal child care expansion (table 2). In column 6, on the other hand, we discard the intermediate examination years from 1996 to 2000 and employ only the variation between the pooled examination years 1994/95 and 2001/2, thereby exploiting solely variation across municipalities in the intensity but not the timing of child care slot creation. In both specifications, the pattern of reverse selection on gains remains statistically significant at the 10 percent level (see the *p*-value in the penultimate row of cols. 5 and 6). In column 7, we make the sample more ho-

³⁴ To estimate the semiparametric MTE curve, we follow the procedure detailed in Heckman et al. (2006, app. B.2) using local quadratic regression to approximate $K(p)$.

³⁵ We classify the child care coverage rate Z into 14 equally sized bins (each with a width of 0.05) and aggregate the X 's into a linear index $x'b$ predicted from a linear probability model for the treatment decision and classify $x'b$ into 20 equally sized bins. The semiparametric estimation of $P(Z)$ then consists of a regression of the treatment dummy on the full set of interactions of the 20 bin dummies of $x'b$ and the 14 bin dummies of Z . The resulting propensity score is highly correlated with our baseline propensity score ($r = .987$) and mirrors its concave shape in Z , suggesting that our baseline first stage approximates $P(Z)$ sufficiently flexibly.

³⁶ We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.




FIG. 5.—MTE curves: functional form robustness checks. The figure displays MTE curves for the outcome of school readiness, evaluated at mean values of the covariates. The solid MTE curve refers to our baseline specification, where the propensity score and its square are included in equation (4), implying a linear MTE curve. The figure also shows three additional MTE curves that allow for richer patterns such as a U-shaped MTE curve: one curve obtained from a semiparametric approach and two curves based on specifications, which include a cubic and quartic of the propensity score in equation (4). Source: Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

mogeneous in age by restricting the sample to children born in the first half of the calendar year, thereby ensuring that all children are examined in the year they turn 6. Estimates in column 8 are based on the full sample but control more flexibly for age at examination, replacing the quadratic in age by monthly age dummies. Again, both specifications lead to a similar pattern of treatment effects and confirm an upward slope of the MTE curve. Our findings also remain largely unaffected when we eliminate the controls for child care quality (see col. 9).

In sum, the overall pattern of reverse selection on gains for the unobserved characteristics in the selection and outcome equations for school readiness is a robust phenomenon.

F. Multivalued Treatment: Generalized Ordered Choice Roy Model

So far, we have collapsed the years of child care attendance into a binary treatment variable of attending child care for (at least) 3 years. Next, we

explicitly take into account the multivalued nature of treatment. Specifically, we model selection as an ordered choice model, distinguishing between being enrolled in child care for 1, 2, or 3 years (or entering child care at age 5, 4, or 3), and estimate two transition-specific MTE curves: one for the decision to attend for 2 years versus 1 year and one for the decision to attend for 3 versus 2 years (as in Heckman et al. [2006] and Heckman and Vytlačil [2007]). We now use as additional instruments the child care coverage rate in the municipality in $t - 2$ (2 years prior to the school entry examination at approximately age 4) and its square, both interacted with minority status, gender, and age, as in the baseline model. First-stage results from a generalized ordered probit model, which allows the instruments and covariates to differentially affect the decisions to attend child care for 2 or more years and to attend for 3 years, show that the child care coverage rate at $t - 2$ strongly predicts the probability of starting child care at age 4, while the child care coverage rate at $t - 3$ is a strong determinant of enrolling in child care at age 3, as expected (see app. A, table A1, and app. B for model details).

To obtain more precise estimates, we then estimate an outcome equation assuming joint normality between the errors in the selection and outcome equations (see app. B for details). We report results in table 6. As in our baseline specification, the results show that minority children are disadvantaged relative to majority children in terms of school readiness if they attend child care for 1 year only (coefficient on “minority”). This disadvantage decreases if minority children attend child care for 2 years (by 4.2 percentage points) and nearly disappears if minority children enroll in child care early at age 3 (by $4.2 + 4.6$ percentage points). A similar pattern emerges for gender, in line with our baseline specification. Since minority children and boys are less likely to attend child care at both the 2-year and the 3-year margins (app. table A1), the results from the generalized ordered probit model therefore confirm a reverse selection on gains based on observed characteristics.

Figure 6 provides evidence in support of a reverse selection on gains based also on unobserved characteristics. In the figure, we plot the transition-specific MTE curves implied by the estimates in table 6. Both MTE curves are upward sloping, and as rows 7 and 8 of table 6 show, both slopes are statistically significant.³⁷ The associated ATEs are about 0.01 for attending 2 versus 1 year of child care and 0.058 for attending 3 versus 2 years, suggesting that earlier interventions may be particularly

³⁷ Define ρ_1 , ρ_2 , and ρ_3 as the correlation coefficients between the three outcome error terms and the selection error term. As we detail in app. B, $\rho_3 - \rho_2$ and $\rho_2 - \rho_1$ can be interpreted as the slopes of the two transition-specific MTE curves of attending child care for 3 vs. 2 years and of attending child care for 2 years vs. 1 year, respectively. While the slopes are significant, the levels of both MTE curves are insignificant in the lower part of u_b but become significant in the upper part, from approximately $U_b > 0.8$.

TABLE 6
OUTCOME EQUATION OF GENERALIZED NORMAL ORDERED
CHOICE ROY MODEL

Variable	Estimate
1. Female	.081*** (.0095)
2. Minority	-.1070*** (.0268)
3. Child care $\geq 2 \times$ female	-.023*** (.0084)
4. Child care $\geq 2 \times$ minority	.042** (.0163)
5. Child care $\geq 3 \times$ female	-.020*** (.0046)
6. Child care $\geq 3 \times$ minority	.046*** (.0097)
Test for upward-sloping MTE curves:	
7. $\rho_3 - \rho_2$	.030** (.0120)
8. $\rho_2 - \rho_1$	.046** (.0194)
Implied ATE:	
9. 2 vs. 1 year	.0098 (.0453)
10. 3 vs. 2 years	.0574 (.0386)

SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

NOTE.—The table presents results from the outcome equation of a generalized normal ordered choice Roy model, modeling three treatment states (attending child care for less than 2 years, for 2 years, or for 3 years or more). The model is described in more detail in app. B, and the first-stage results are shown in table A1 of app. A. The outcome equation is estimated by including Heckman-type selection correction terms for all three treatment states generated from the first-stage model and by interacting all covariates with dummies for at least 2 years and at least 3 years of child care. For minority children, e.g., the coefficients on the interaction terms child care $\geq 2 \times$ minority and child care $\geq 3 \times$ minority in rows 4 and 6 show that minority children have a higher treatment effect for both moving from 1–2 years of child care and moving from 2–3 years of child care. The variables ρ_1 , ρ_2 , and ρ_3 are the correlations of the outcome error terms in each of the three states (U_1 , U_2 , and U_3) with the error term of the selection equation denoted by V . The differences $\rho_3 - \rho_2$ and $\rho_2 - \rho_1$ are reported in rows 7 and 8 of the table and are informative on the pattern of selection, with positive values for the difference indicating reverse selection on gains (a rising MTE curve). Transition-specific ATEs (at mean values of covariates) are reported in rows 9 and 10 in the table, and the corresponding transition-specific MTE curves are depicted in fig. 6. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. Number of observations is 131,845.

* Statistically significant at the .10 level.

** Statistically significant at the .05 level.

*** Statistically significant at the .01 level.




FIG. 6.—MTE curves from ordered selection model for 1, 2, and 3 years of child care. The figure displays separate MTE curves for the effects of moving from 1 year of child care to 2 years of child care (solid line) and moving from 2 years of child care to 3 years (dashed line) for the outcome of school readiness based on a normal selection model with a generalized ordered probit selection equation (see app. B for a description of that model). The curves are evaluated at mean values of the covariates. Both curves are statistically significantly upward sloping pointing toward a selection pattern of reverse selection on gains. Source: Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

effective. The higher ATE at the 3-versus 2-year margin is compatible with the notion of “skills beget skills” as emphasized, for instance, by Cunha and Heckman (2007).

Modeling treatment as an ordered choice of attending child care for either 1, 2, or 3 years rather than as a binary decision (our baseline definition) therefore does not qualitatively change our main findings.

G. Other Outcomes and Child Care Quality Characteristics

Having focused so far on school readiness as an index for the pediatrician's overall assessment of the child's physical and behavioral development, we now assess four additional outcomes linked to the school readiness examination: no motor skill problems, no compensatory sport required, and two measures relating to BMI (for which smaller effects are “better”). The summary treatment effects based on our baseline specification that defines treatment as attending child care for 3 years

are reported in table 7, panel A. The results reveal the same selection pattern for all outcomes, with the most beneficial effects of child care being found for untreated children. As indicated by the reported *p*-values, selection based on unobserved gains is not statistically significant for motor skills and no compensatory sport (a zero slope of the MTE curve can-

TABLE 7
OTHER OUTCOMES

	School Readiness	Motor Skills	No Compensa- tory Sport	Overweight	Log BMI
A. Conventional Treatment Effects					
ATE	.059 (.072)	.018 (.088)	.203** (.092)	.017 (.034)	.025 (.023)
TT	-.051 (.080)	.001 (.118)	.099 (.119)	.052 (.045)	.045 (.028)
TUT	.173** (.085)	.035 (.103)	.308*** (.115)	-.019 (.037)	.003 (.027)
<i>p</i> -value of test for essential heterogeneity	.029	.767	.214	.071	.152
B. Effects of Child Care Quality Characteristics					
Above-median child-to-staff ratio $\times$ propensity score	.005 (.031)	.041 (.034)	-.044 (.045)	-.016 (.019)	-.008 (.010)
Share of high educated among staff $\times$ propensity score	.025 (.258)	.465* (.267)	-.229 (.406)	-.003 (.113)	.035 (.075)
Share of male staff $\times$ male child $\times$ propensity score	.013** (.007)	.028*** (.007)	.033** (.014)	-.008** (.004)	-.005** (.002)
Share of male staff $\times$ female child $\times$ propensity score	.008 (.007)	.015** (.008)	.009 (.012)	-.009*** (.003)	-.006*** (.002)

SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

NOTE.—Panel A reports the average treatment effect (ATE), the treatment effect on the treated (TT), the treatment effect on the untreated (TUT), and the *p*-value for a test of essential heterogeneity for five outcomes: our main outcome of school readiness, no motor skill problems, no compensatory sport required, overweight, measured as the BMI above the (age- and gender-specific) 90th percentile, and the log BMI. Panel B displays coefficient estimates of the interaction terms between child care quality indicators and the propensity score; these terms measure how child care quality influences the returns to early child care attendance. Further included controls not displayed in the table are age and age squared and time-varying municipality sociodemographic characteristics as well as child care quality indicators (interacted with the propensity score) as well as cohort dummies, municipality dummies, and birth month dummies (not interacted with the propensity score). Coefficients on the interaction terms of share of male staff refer to a 1 percentage point change in this share. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.

* Statistically significant at the .10 level.

** Statistically significant at the .05 level.

*** Statistically significant at the .01 level.

not be rejected). For the overweight indicator ($\text{BMI} > 90\text{th percentile}$), reverse selection on unobserved gains is significant at the 10 percent level, while for log BMI significance falls just short of the 15 percent level.

Turning to the sign and magnitude of treatment effects, the estimated ATE and TUT for no compensatory sport are sizable and statistically significant, implying that entering child care early improves physical health for the average child and for the currently untreated child. The point estimates further suggest that child care attendance increases BMI and the risk of overweight for the currently treated child; however, they are too imprecisely estimated to be statistically significantly different from zero.³⁸

Panel B of table 7 reports the results related to child care quality characteristics, which, in line with recent findings (e.g., Walters [2015] for evidence on Head Start), generally show no strong treatment effects on the different outcomes for either child-to-staff ratio or staff education. Interestingly, however, they do provide some evidence that having male staff improves treatment effects across all outcomes for boys and also increases motor skills and reduces the potentially harmful effects of early child care attendance on BMI and overweight for girls. This effect could result from male teachers serving as role models for boys, involving them in activities they like, and being generally more likely than female staff to engage children in activities conducive to physical exercise.³⁹

VI. Interpretation and Implications

A. *The Role of Family Background*

Given our finding that, in terms of both observed and unobserved characteristics, children with the lowest resistance to early child care enrollment benefit the least from early child care attendance, we now attempt to throw more light on the reverse selection on gains it implies. To this end, we first investigate whether the increasing gains from treatment by resistance to treatment (i.e., $E(U_1 - U_0|U_D = u_D)$ in eq. [3]) are driven by differences in the outcome when untreated (i.e., $E(U_0|U_D = u_D)$) or by the differences in outcome when treated (i.e., $E(U_1|U_D = u_D)$). Specifically, adopting the procedure proposed by Brinch et al. (2017) based on the control function estimator described in Heckman and Vytlačil (2007), in figure 7, part A, we plot the separate curves for U_1 and U_0 for our main outcome variable of school readiness. The pattern is striking: whereas the

³⁸ In the US context, Herbst and Tekin (2010, 2012) report sizable increases in BMI and overweight because of subsidized child care.

³⁹ The evidence in the school literature on the effects of teacher gender is mixed. For example, whereas Dee (2006) finds that teacher gender has a notable effect on the test performance of a sample of eighth graders, Bertrand and Pan (2013) identify no effect of teacher gender on the gap in behavioral problems between boys and girls. We are unaware of any evidence of teacher gender effects in the child care context.




FIG. 7.—Counterfactual outcome (unobserved part) as a function of resistance to treatment, by treatment state. Part A: School readiness. Part B: Attended routine postnatal checkups. Part C: Postnatal checkup book present. Part D: College degree mother. Part E: College degree father. Part F: Single child. Part A plots, for our main outcome of school readiness, the unobserved component of the outcome against the unobserved resistance to treatment U_D , separately for the treated (i.e., $E[U_1|U_D = u_D]$, dashed line) and untreated (i.e., $E[U_0|U_D = u_D]$, solid line) state, following Brinch et al. (2017). Parts B–F repeat the exercise but use indicator variables for whether the child attended the first four routine postnatal medical checkups before entry into child care (part B); whether the postnatal checkup book is present at the examination (part C); whether the mother or father holds a college degree (parts D and E); and whether the child is a single child (part F) as dependent variables, to learn about how families with a low resistance to enroll their child in early child care differ from families with a high resistance. Source: Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

curve in the untreated state U_0 is falling, it is nearly flat in the treated state U_1 . This pattern implies not only that the larger treatment effect on school readiness among high- versus low-resistance children can be entirely explained by the former's lower school readiness in the untreated state (falling U_0) but also that early child care attendance serves as an equalizer that

TABLE 8
CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS FOR 3-YEAR-OLDS, 1994 AND 2000 (%)

	1994	2000
Public child care	41.2	75.8
Only family care (parents and other relatives)	58.3	22.7
Exclusively maternal care	39.3	18.8
Informal care (nanny, other nonrelatives)	1.2	1.5
Maternal labor force participation (3-year-olds)	31.2	38.7
Public child care, children of working mothers	42.9	81.5
Public child care, children of nonworking mothers	40.5	72.2

SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on Family Survey from the German Youth Institute (DJI), Munich, second and third waves (1994 and 2000). The sample refers to 3-year-olds in West Germany and consists of 262 children in 1994 and 354 children in 2000.

NOTE.—The table provides, for the years 1994 and 2000, information on child care arrangements of 3-year-olds, distinguishing between public child care, only family care by parents or grandparents, only maternal care, and care by a child minder or nanny. The table also reports labor force participation rates of mothers of 3-year-olds, as well as public child care attendance rates of 3-year-olds separately by the mother's labor force status.

almost removes the intergroup difference in school readiness (flat U_1). The nearly flat curve in the treated state further implies that quality differences between child care centers are small, reflecting the relatively homogeneous quality of child care centers in Germany (see Sec. IV.A).

This latter observation makes us wonder what type of child care arrangements families in Germany use when their children are not enrolled in early child care. In table 8 we compile data from the German Family Survey on child care attendance, alternative child care arrangements, and maternal labor force participation for 3-year-olds residing in West Germany in 1994 and 2000. The table shows that the alternative to formal child care is almost exclusively family care, by either parents or grandparents. Care outside the family by a child minder or nanny is extremely rare and is used by fewer than 2 percent of families.⁴⁰ This finding stands in contrast to the United States, where childhood interventions not only replace family care but also partly crowd out other forms of center-based child care (Walters 2015; Bitler et al. 2016; Elango et al. 2016; Kline and Walters 2016).

Another feature of our setting is that mothers' labor force participation rates—31 percent in 1994 and 39 percent in 2000—are much lower than their offspring's child care attendance rates. Thus, even though early child care attendance is higher for the children of working mothers, it is also common for those whose mothers do not work.

We are also curious to know how families with low early enrollment resistance differ from those with high resistance. To this end, in parts B–E of figure 7, we again plot separate curves for U_1 and U_0 (as in part A) but

⁴⁰ Even among highly educated mothers, the share using other types of informal care was only 4 percent in 2000.

using family background characteristics as the dependent variable. Once we net out the effects of the observed characteristics included in the prior analyses, U_1 and U_0 must be interpreted as the unobserved components of family background characteristics. In parts B and C, the dependent variables are equal to one if the parents attended routine medical postnatal checkups when the child was under 3 (i.e., prior to early child care attendance) and presented the checkup record at the school entry examination. Both variables are strongly positively associated with a more favorable family background and represent the only family background-related data available over our entire sample period.⁴¹ According to the figure, regardless of the child's early care enrollment status, parents with low resistance to enrollment are more likely than those with high resistance to have attended routine checkups and brought the checkup record to the examination.

In parts D–F of the figure, we confirm a similar pattern using more standard family background characteristics, such as parental education. Because such variables are included in our data only from 2001 onward, however, these illustrations refer to the 2001–3 time period when the child care expansion was almost complete, and the analysis is thus based on a less stringent identification strategy than previously. Nevertheless, it still provides interesting insights into the differences between low- and high-resistance children. First, regardless of the child's enrollment status, the parents of low-resistance (vs. high-resistance) children are more likely to be college-educated (parts D and E), and the mothers of low-resistance children are more likely to have only one child (part F). Overall, therefore, the findings reported in figure 7, parts B–F, suggest that children with high resistance to early child care enrollment come from a more disadvantaged family background than those with low resistance, which explains why the former face worse outcomes than the latter when not enrolled (see part A).

These observations give rise to two questions: First, given the potentially large benefits to the children, why are disadvantaged children not enrolled in early child care more often? Conversely, why do advantaged children attend child care early even when there are no apparent benefits? One important reason for these decisions may be that when choosing their children's care arrangements, parents maximize a welfare function that includes a combination of their own utility and the child's utility (see also Havnes and Mogstad 2015). Thus, although advantaged parents could provide their children with a high-quality home environment, they may nevertheless opt for child care because of their own labor market involvement or

⁴¹ For instance, for the examination cohorts 2001–3, only 81 percent of mothers without any schooling degree presented the checkup record vs. around 93 percent of mothers with an apprenticeship qualification (or higher).

their own preferences for leisure consumption, which may induce them to enroll their child into early care even when not working.

A second important reason is that prior to and throughout the expansion period, enrollment decisions, in case of excess demand, were made not only by parents but also by child care centers. The typical allocation mechanism adopted by centers, which besides the child's age as the primary admission criterion was based on mothers' labor force status and time on the waiting list, likely favored advantaged mothers, who are more likely to work and who are also likely to be better informed about the admission process than disadvantaged mothers.

Yet, even after the expansion of child care slots has been completed and child care slots are principally available for all applicants, early child care attendance rates of disadvantaged minority children lag behind those of advantaged majority children. Besides lower labor market participation rates of disadvantaged minority mothers, the reason could be that disadvantaged mothers are not as well informed about the benefits of public child care as advantaged mothers (e.g., Cunha et al. 2013; Elango et al. 2016) or are generally more critical toward early child care for cultural or religious reasons.⁴² In addition, despite heavy subsidies, disadvantaged families may face higher child care costs (relative to income) than advantaged families, which may deter them from early child care enrollment because they cannot borrow against their child's future income. In contrast, access to child care facilities, measured as the walking time to the nearest center, hardly varies between disadvantaged and advantaged children.⁴³

B. Policy Simulations

The higher returns to treatment for children with high versus low resistance to early child care enrollment imply that policies that succeed in at-

⁴² Schober and Stahl (2014), using data from the International Social Survey for West Germany, show that negative attitudes toward child care (measured by agreement with such statements as "family members should be the main care providers for children not attending school yet") are negatively correlated with individuals' education and more common among non-German respondents. With regard to the latter, a recent study by the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (2015) finds the main reasons that minority children are less likely than majority children to be enrolled in early child care to be a focus on the German language and absence of multilingualism in child care, in addition to cultural factors such as different child-rearing beliefs (love and care by the mother instead of fostering early independence).

⁴³ According to data from the 1994 German Family Survey for West Germany, 80 percent of women with high secondary schooling lived within a 15-minute walking distance to a child care center vs. 75 percent of women with low secondary schooling. Data for West Germany from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1994 show that 55 percent of children of immigrant origin resided within a 10-minute walking distance to a child care facility vs. 51 percent of children of majority origin.

tracting high-resistance children into child care have large benefits. We therefore quantify these benefits for four different policies with a focus on our main outcome variable of school readiness. To do so, we compute policy-relevant treatment effects (PRTE; see Heckman and Vytlačil 2001, 2005; Carneiro et al. 2011) as a weighted average over the MTE curve with the weights reflecting the population of individuals shifted by the policy (see eq. [29] in Cornelissen et al. [2016] for a formal definition).

We first simulate a policy that brings the average early attendance rate (or, equivalently, the propensity score) from its 2002 level of 0.67 to a level of 0.9, as advocated by the European Union in its Barcelona targets (European Union 2002). Similarly to Carneiro et al., we model the increase in the propensity score in two different ways: by adding the same constant to each child’s 2002 propensity score to produce an average of 0.9 and by multiplying each score by the same constant. We set to one any resulting propensity scores that would be larger than one. Both procedures give very similar results (see table 9, rows 1 and 2) and show large and statistically

TABLE 9
POLICY-RELEVANT TREATMENT EFFECTS

	PRTE (1)	PROPENSITY SCORE	
		Baseline (2)	Policy (3)
1. Bring 2002 $P(Z)$ to .9 by adding .275	.160* (.085)	.67	.90
2. Bring 2002 $P(Z)$ to .9 by multiplying 1.5	.165* (.087)	.67	.90
3. Lift 2002 cohort’s coverage rate (Z) to 1 if < 1	.123 (.077)	.67	.71
4. Add .4 to 2002 cohort’s coverage rate (Z)	.141* (.086)	.67	.72

SOURCE.—Authors’ calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

NOTE.—The table reports in col. 1 policy-relevant treatment effects (PRTE) per net child shifted for four different policies. In rows 1 and 2, we simulate a policy that brings the average early attendance rate (or, equivalently, the propensity score) from its 2002 level of 0.67 to a level of 0.9 by adding a constant of 0.275 to each child’s 2002 propensity score (row 1) or by multiplying each child’s 2002 propensity score by a constant of 1.5 (row 2). In rows 3 and 4, we instead directly manipulate the 2002 cohort’s child care coverage rate (i.e., the coverage rate measured in 1999, when the 2002 cohort was 3 years old—our instrument). In row 3, we set the coverage rate to 1 for municipalities in which it is below 1; in row 4, we instead add a constant of 0.4 to the coverage rate, allowing for coverage rates greater than 1 in some municipalities. Columns 2 and 3 show the increase in the propensity score that each policy induces. Estimates refer to our baseline specification displayed in cols. 1 and 2 of table 4 and part A of fig. 4. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses.

* Statistically significant at the .10 level.

** Statistically significant at the .05 level.

*** Statistically significant at the .01 level.

significant PRTes, implying an increase in school readiness of 16–17 percentage points per child shifted.

Modeling a policy by direct manipulation of the propensity score, however, says nothing about how to actually draw more highly resistant children into early child care. Because one intuitive solution is to create more child care slots, in rows 3 and 4 of table 9, we simulate two policies that directly manipulate the child care coverage rate (our instrument) and thus affect the propensity score indirectly through the number of available child care slots. In the first policy (row 3), we simulate the effect of increasing the 2002 cohort's coverage rate (i.e., the coverage rate measured in 1999, when the 2002 cohort was 3 years old) to one for municipalities in which it is below one. In the second policy (row 4), we simply add a constant of 0.4 to the 2002 cohort's coverage rate. Both these policies shift children with high treatment effects from unobserved characteristics into treatment, thereby increasing the probability of school readiness by 12.3 and 14.1 percentage points, respectively, per child shifted, which in the latter case is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Nevertheless, despite the sizable expansion in child care slots, these policies increase early child care attendance by only 4–5 percentage points and induce no change in the early child care attendance rate of minority children (who experience particularly large improvements in school readiness from early child care). We attribute this minimal effect to the concavity of the relation between the child care supply and the propensity to early child care attendance in both majority and (particularly) minority children (see table 4 and fig. 2). These findings emphasize that creating additional child care slots alone is not enough to attract more children (and specifically minority children) into child care. Thus, to achieve attendance rates of 90 percent as advocated by the European Union, the expansion in child care slots should be complemented by other policies such as informational campaigns or free access to child care for disadvantaged and minority families.

VII. Conclusions

In this paper, we assess the heterogeneity in the effects of universal child care on child development at the age of school entry by estimating marginal returns to early child care attendance. Building on a tighter identification strategy than adopted in the related MTE literature and using novel administrative data on child outcomes in a context in which all children undergo standardized and mandatory school entry examinations, we document substantial heterogeneity in the returns to early child care attendance with respect to both observed and unobserved child characteristics. For our main outcome of school readiness, we find that when attending child care late, minority children are 12 percentage points less

likely to be ready for school than majority children. Attending child care early, however, nearly eliminates the differences between minority and majority children. Yet despite these larger returns from treatment, minority children are substantially less likely than majority children to enter child care early, pointing to a pattern of reverse selection on gains based on these observed child characteristics. We document a similar pattern for unobserved child characteristics: children with unobserved characteristics that make them least likely to enter child care early benefit the most from early child care attendance. We also provide evidence that these children may be disproportionately drawn from disadvantaged family backgrounds.

Overall, our results show not only that heterogeneity in children's responses to early child care attendance and parental resistance to child enrollment are key when evaluating universal child care programs but also that parents' choices on behalf of their children may differ from those that the children themselves would make. They further suggest that the universal child care program that we study disproportionately subsidizes advantaged families whose children have the least to gain from early child care attendance. At the same time, it does not sufficiently reach minority and disadvantaged families whose children would benefit the most from the program.

These observations raise the question, what type of policies could be implemented to draw these hard-to-reach children into early child care? One important first step (recently enacted by some German states) may be to make child care free for disadvantaged families while eliminating, or at least reducing, subsidies to advantaged families, thereby possibly improving child outcomes without increasing public spending. Such a policy, however, does not address the informational deficits and the cultural or religious concerns that may make disadvantaged and minority families resistant to enrollment in public child care and prevent them from fully appreciating its advantages. Hence, policies that inform disadvantaged families about the benefits of early child care ought to take account of cultural heterogeneity. They should carefully address culturally or religiously motivated concerns of parents while actively supporting their children's enrollment in programs to improve the take-up rate of hard-to-reach children.

Appendix A

Additional Tables and Figures




FIG. A1.—Common support of propensity score: instrument not interacted with covariates. Part A: Quadratic specification of the instrument. Part B: Linear specification of the instrument. The figure plots the frequency distribution of the propensity score by treatment status. Part A of the figure is based on a quadratic specification in the instrument in the selection equation (as in the robustness check in col. 2 of table 5), while part B is based on a linear specification in the instrument (as in the robustness check of col. 3 in table 5). Source: Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

TABLE A1
FIRST STAGE OF NORMAL ORDERED SELECTION MODEL

	Marginal Effects on P(Child Care ≥ 3) (1)	Marginal Effects on P(Child Care ≥ 2) (2)
Child care coverage rate	.224*** (.0649)	.103** (.0422)
Child care coverage rate squared	-.1726 (.1908)	-.204* (.1145)
Child care coverage rate $\times$ minority	.314** (.1447)	.1115 (.0792)
Child care coverage rate squared $\times$ minority	-.5938 (.4929)	.0022 (.2414)
Female	.015*** (.0037)	.006** (.0026)
Minority	-.214*** (.0156)	-.177*** (.0076)

SOURCE.—Authors' calculations based on school entry examinations, Weser-Ems, 1994–2002, as the main data source.

NOTE.—The table presents the first-stage results from the ordered normal selection model in table 6. The model is described in more detail in app. B. The child care coverage rates are measured relative to their overall mean. In col. 1, the child care coverage rate refers to $t - 3$ (the year in which a child who wants to attend for 3 years would typically enter child care). In col. 2, the child care coverage rate refers to $t - 2$ (the year in which a child who wants to attend for 2 years would typically enter child care). The marginal effects are computed after estimation of a generalized ordered probit model, in which all covariates and instruments are allowed to have varying effects on the thresholds. All covariates that are also in our baseline specification in table 4 are included but not reported to save space. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. Number of observations is 131,845.

* Statistically significant at the .10 level.

** Statistically significant at the .05 level.

*** Statistically significant at the .01 level.

Appendix B

Normal Generalized Ordered Choice Roy Model

We extend our baseline analysis to multiple treatment states and associated outcomes by implementing a generalized ordered choice Roy model (Heckman et al. 2006; Heckman and Vytlacil 2007) based on joint normality of the errors in the selection and outcome equations. Instead of the binary choice model in (2), we now have an ordered choice model:

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_i &= 1 && \text{if } Z_i\gamma - V_i \leq \kappa_1, \\
 S_i &= 2 && \text{if } \kappa_1 < Z_i\gamma - V_i \leq \kappa_2, \\
 S_i &= 3 && \text{if } \kappa_2 < Z_i\gamma - V_i,
 \end{aligned}$$

in which S_i is the multivalued treatment variable (1, 2, or 3 years of child care attendance), $Z_i\gamma - V_i$ is a latent linear index, and κ_1 and κ_2 are two threshold pa-

rameters. For simplicity, we write the thresholds as constants, but in our empirical analysis we allow the thresholds to depend on the regressors.⁴⁴

There are three potential outcomes $Y_{ji} = X\beta_j + U_{ji}$ for $j = \{1, 2, 3\}$, and the observed outcome is equal to $Y_i = \sum_{j=1}^3 I(S_i = j) Y_{ji}$, where $I(\cdot)$ is the indicator function.

Assume joint normality of $(U_{1i}, U_{2i}, U_{3i}, V_i)$ and define

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_1 &= P(S_i > 1) = P(V_i \leq Z_i\gamma - \kappa_1) = \Phi(Z_i\gamma - \kappa_1), \\ \pi_2 &= P(S_i > 2) = P(V_i \leq Z_i\gamma - \kappa_2) = \Phi(Z_i\gamma - \kappa_2), \\ \rho_j &= \text{Corr}(U_{ji}, V_i).\end{aligned}$$

The expectations of U_{1i} , U_{2i} , and U_{3i} conditional on the treatment state in which each of them is observed can then be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned}E[U_{1i}|S_i = 1] &= E[U_{1i}|Z_i\gamma - \kappa_1 < V_i] = \rho_1 \frac{\phi(Z_i\gamma - \kappa_1)}{1 - \Phi(Z_i\gamma - \kappa_1)} \\ &= \rho_1 \frac{\phi(\Phi^{-1}(\pi_1))}{1 - \pi_1}, \\ E[U_{2i}|S_i = 2] &= E[U_{2i}|Z_i\gamma - \kappa_2 < V_i \leq Z_i\gamma - \kappa_1] \\ &= \rho_2 \frac{\phi(Z_i\gamma - \kappa_2) - \phi(Z_i\gamma - \kappa_1)}{\Phi(Z_i\gamma - \kappa_1) - \Phi(Z_i\gamma - \kappa_2)} \\ &= \rho_2 \frac{\phi(\Phi^{-1}(\pi_2)) - \phi(\Phi^{-1}(\pi_1))}{\pi_1 - \pi_2}, \\ E[U_{3i}|S_i = 3] &= E[U_{3i}|V_i \leq Z_i\gamma - \kappa_2] = \rho_3 \frac{-\phi(\Phi^{-1}(\pi_2))}{\pi_2}.\end{aligned}$$

The ratios on the right-hand side of these expressions are Heckman-type selection correction terms. We construct them on the basis of predictions of π_1 and π_2 from the first-stage generalized ordered probit model and include them as correction terms into the outcome equation. The associated coefficients provide estimates for ρ_1 , ρ_2 , and ρ_3 . We obtain standard errors by bootstrapping, including both the first and second stages into the bootstrap loop.

The transition-specific MTE curves, which we depict at means of the covariates in figure 6, have the following representation that directly follows from the joint normality of $(U_{1i}, U_{2i}, U_{3i}, V_i)$:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_{1,2}^{\text{MTE}}(x, u_d) &= x(\beta_2 - \beta_1) + (\rho_2 - \rho_1)\Phi^{-1}(u_d), \\ \Delta_{2,3}^{\text{MTE}}(x, u_d) &= x(\beta_3 - \beta_2) + (\rho_3 - \rho_2)\Phi^{-1}(u_d).\end{aligned}$$

⁴⁴ Given the normality assumption, the model in which the thresholds depend on the regressors is a generalized ordered probit model, which we estimate in Stata using the command `goprobit` by Stefan Boes.

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